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Foreword
This paper is one of a series commissioned by the Committee for Public 
Management Research.  The Committee is developing a comprehensive programme 
of research designed to serve the needs of the future developments of the Irish 
public service.  Committee members come from the Departments of Finance, 
Environment and Local Government, Health and Children, Taoiseach, and Public 
Enterprise, and also from Trinity College Dublin, University College Dublin, and 
Institute of Public Administration.  The research is undertaken for the Committee by 
the research department at the Institute of Public Administration.
This series aims to prompt discussion and debate on topical issues of 
particular interest or concern.  Papers may outline experience, both national and 
international, in dealing with a particular issue.  Or they may be more conceptual in 
nature, prompting the development of new ideas on public management issues.  The 
papers are not intended to set out any official position on the topic under scrutiny.  
Rather, the intention is to identify current thinking and best practice.
We would very much welcome comments on this paper and on public 
management research more generally.  To ensure the discussion papers and wider 
research programme of the Committee for Public Management Research are  
relevant to managers and staff, we need to hear from you.  What do you think of the 
issues being raised?  Are there other topics you would like to see researched?
Research into the problems, solutions and successes of public management 
processes, and the way organisations can best adapt in a changing environment has 
much to contribute to good management, and is a vital element in the public service 
renewal process.  The Committee for Public Management Research intends to 
provide a service to people working in public organisations by enhancing the 
knowledge base on public management issues.
Eric Embleton, Chair
Committee for Public Management Research
Department of Finance
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For further information or to pass on any comments please contact:
Pat Hickson, Secretary
Committee for Public Management Research
Department of Finance
Lansdowne House, Lansdowne Road
Dublin 4
Phone: (+353) 1 676 7571;  Fax: (+353) 1 668 2182
E-Mail: pat_hickson@cmod.finance.irlgov.ie
or
Richard Boyle
Institute of Public Administration
Vergemount Hall
Clonskeagh
Dublin 6
Phone: (+353) 1 269 7011;  Fax: (+353) 1 269 8644,
E-Mail: rboyle@ipa.ie
General information on the activities of the Committee for Public 
Management Research, including this paper and others in the series, can be found 
on its world wide web site: www.irlgov.ie/cpmr; information on Institute of Public 
Administration research in progress can be found at www.ipa.ie.
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Governance and Accountability
in the Irish Civil Service
1.  Introduction
This discussion paper was commissioned by the Committee for Public Management 
Research to examine the governance and accountability implications of recent 
legislative changes in Irish civil service management.  In particular it was felt to be 
useful to put the changes taking place in international context, and to raise issues 
and distil lessons being learned from international experience.1
As the changes taking place in governance and accountability are at an early 
stage in the Irish civil service, this paper can be regarded as an initial attempt to 
raise issues which will need to be addressed by civil servants and politicians.  The 
aim is to prompt informed discussion and debate on these issues rather than to 
attempt to provide definitive answers at this stage.  The Committee for Public 
Management Research see the need for further study in this area as the changes 
begin to impact, assessing the practical implications for accountability of current 
governance changes.
Governance and accountability changes are taking place in many countries 
at present.  Governance here is taken to mean “the collection of rules, standards and 
norms that inform the behaviour of civil and public servants and politicians in 
conducting the business of state with and on behalf of the public” (Tutty, 1998.  See 
Appendix 1 for a more detailed discussion on the term governance).  Schick, in a 
review of budgeting reforms in Australia, France, New Zealand, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom for the OECD (OECD, 1997) outlines the direction of change:
The traditional governing structure concentrated control of human and 
financial resources at the centre and operational responsibility for delivering 
services at the bottom of organisations.  At one end of government were the 
controllers, at the other end the controlled.  The centre issued rules, 
monitored compliance with the rules, and intervened as it thought 
appropriate; the operating echelons complied, or at least pretended to ... 
The current spate of reforms ... are centred around accountability 
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frameworks in which the government entrust spending agencies with 
flexibility in using resources, in exchange for holding them responsible for 
results.  The repertoire of devices for enforcing managerial accountability 
includes strategic and operational plans, performance measures and targets, 
contracts for personal and organisational performance, decoupling service 
delivery from policy making, new accountability rules and annual reports, 
more active use of evaluation and auditing , and financial inducements and 
sanctions.  The mix of new instruments varies among the countries that have 
ventured along these lines, but in all there has been marked devolution of 
financial and overall managerial control and the introduction of novel 
arrangements for holding agencies and managers to account.
The process of governing in Ireland is currently undergoing change in the 
broad direction indicated above.  The Public Service Management Act, 1997, the 
Freedom of Information Act, 1997, the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas 
(Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act, 1997 and the Ethics 
in Public Office Act, 1995, together represent a significant alteration in governance 
arrangements.  These changes, which build on earlier changes such as extending the 
role of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Ombudsman legislation, have 
implications for how accountability is exercised in the civil service.
It should also be noted that there are significant changes taking place in 
governance and accountability relationships in local government and the health 
services.  In the absence of a specific provision for local government in the 
Constitution, the existence of, and affairs of, local government fall to be determined 
by the Oireachtas.  Governments and the Oireachtas have taken steps in recent years 
in particular to limit control to key issues only, in response to a view that central 
control over local government is excessive.  Better Local Government: A
Programme for Change (1996) aims to further develop the governance system of 
local government, focusing on four core principles: enhancing local democracy; 
serving the customer better; developing efficiency; and providing proper resources.  
In the health services, an important governance change was the introduction of the 
Health (Amendment) (No. 3) Act, 1996, also known as the accountability 
legislation.  This Act has three main objectives: to strengthen and improve the 
arrangements governing financial accountability and expenditure procedure in health 
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boards; to clarify the respective roles of the members of health boards and their 
chief executive officers; and to begin the process of removing the Department of 
Health from detailed involvement in operational matters.  These changes in health 
and local governance, whilst crucial to the future operation of these sectors, are not 
specifically addressed further in this study, which focuses on the civil service.
It is also important to note that this paper concentrates on governance and 
accountability issues regarding the executive arm of government.  In particular, the 
accountability implications for civil servants of new governance arrangements are 
explored.  Issues such as the role of tribunals and the accountability of politicians 
(other than ministers as political heads of government departments) are not the 
focus of the paper.
The governance and accountability changes occurring in the civil service 
have implications for various groups: citizens, the Oireachtas, ministers, central 
government officials and staff working in state agencies and non-departmental 
public bodies.  Figure 1 illustrates how responsibility is devolved and accountability 
is exercised.  For example, citizens elect members of the Oireachtas, and 
accountability of the Oireachtas to citizens is directly exercised through the ballot 
box.  The government collectively, and individual ministers as heads of departments, 
hold a pivotal position in terms of specifying the performance expected of 
government departments, offices and agencies and in terms of reporting back on 
performance to the Oireachtas.  Within government departments, secretaries general 
now have delegated responsibility for managing their departments, and they in turn 
can assign specific responsibilities to managers at other levels.  Heads of offices 
similarly have delegated responsibilities.  In return for this delegation, civil servants 
are now more directly accountable for their actions.  Thus while ministers must 
carry the ultimate political accountability for the actions of the civil and public 
service, secretaries general and heads of offices now have specific accountability for 
the running of their organisations.  Below them, civil servants may have specified 
accountabilities associated with their specific areas of responsibility.
Figure 1
Responsbility
Citizens
Oireachtas
Government Accountability
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In broad terms, there is a move to enhance open and transparent 
governance.  As indicated in Delivering Better Government (1996):
It is essential that there is a free flow of information between Government 
and those it serves ... an open culture with a free flow of information 
between Government and citizen is essential if confidence is to be 
maintained in the institutions of State.  The electorate of the next century 
will be the most highly educated in history and, owing to advances in 
information technology, will have access to, and use of, a bewildering 
amount of information.  For the institutions of State to remain relevant, they 
must recognise this trend and become much more open about their 
activities.
2.  The changing governance and accountability context 
for the Irish civil
The governance structure of civil service management in Ireland has changed 
significantly over the last couple of decades.  The establishment of the Office of the 
Ombudsman in 1984 under the Ombudsman Act; the introduction of a Data 
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Protection Commissioner in 1989 under the Data Protection Act; and the 
introduction of a value for money remit for the Comptroller and Auditor General 
under the Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) Act 1993, are all 
illustrative of moves to enhance governance and accountability arrangements.  
These legislative changes have been complemented by changes within the public 
service such as the greater exploitation of information technology, the development 
of financial management systems, and the introduction of the Strategic Management 
Initiative (SMI) (see Boyle, 1995 for further details).
More specifically, over the last couple of years there have been major 
legislative changes which affect how the public service operates2.  The following are 
central from the perspective of governance and accountability:
Public Services Management Act, 1997.  This Act provides the central 
accountability framework for governance changes in the Irish civil service, setting 
out a formal structure for assigning authority and accountability within the civil 
service.  The Act aims to clarify the roles and duties of individual civil servants.  
Under the Act, each department and office must publish a strategy statement every 
three years or within six months of the appointment of a new Minister, setting out 
key objectives, outputs and strategies to be achieved.  Specific functions in relation 
to the management of staff are delegated to secretaries general of departments, who 
in turn can assign responsibility to civil servants at other levels for specific matters.  
The assignment of responsibility for cross-departmental matters is also dealt with 
under the Act.
Freedom of Information Act, 1997. This Act provides citizens with a legal 
right of access to official and personal information, subject to exemptions and 
ensuring the right to privacy, and encompassing an independent appeals system.  All 
public bodies must produce guides containing information on their structures, 
organisation, functions, duties and powers, services they provide and the 
procedures by which the services are delivered.  Public bodies must also publish a 
general description of the classes of records they maintain, including details of how 
the public can access these records.  There is a designated Information 
Commissioner (a job to be undertaken by the Ombudsman), responsible for 
safeguarding the rights of individuals to official information.
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Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges 
and Immunities of Witnesses) Act, 1997. This Act gives Oireachtas Committees 
increased powers of investigation in areas of public concern.  Committees will be 
able to compel witnesses to attend hearings and to respond to questions.  Witnesses 
appearing before committees will have the same privileges as High Court witnesses, 
with their evidence being immune from defamation actions or self-incrimination.
Ethics in Public Office Act, 1995.  This Act requires members of the 
Oireachtas, senior civil and other public servants, public board members and senior 
executives of state bodies to disclose their business interests.  These interests must 
be disclosed to committees established in both Houses of the Oireachtas.  The 
information is published annually in Iris Oifiguil.  The Act is overseen by an 
independent Public Offices Commission.
Further legislation is being planned to supplement and complement these 
pieces of legislation, which will also have a significant impact on governance and 
accountability (Tuohy, 1997).  Changes to the Ombudsman legislation are intended 
to give a wider remit to the Ombudsman.  The option to have cases investigated and 
settled informally will be introduced, making it easier for citizens to bring a case.  
The issue of citizens rights with regard to service provision from state agencies will 
also be addressed.  Amendments to the Civil Service Regulations Act, 1956 are also 
proposed.  These aim to formalise and give legal effect to changes in the operation 
of the civil service regulations that govern appointments, conditions of employment 
and staffing issues, in line with changes proposed in the Public Service Management 
Act, 1997 and in Delivering Better Government (1996).
Taken together, these pieces of legislation and proposed legislation aim to 
update governance and accountability arrangements for the civil service.  It is 
important to note, however, that whilst accountability relationships, and in 
particular the formal assigning of responsibility and accountability to secretaries 
general and heads of offices represents a clear change from what has gone before, 
this change takes place within the context of the Constitution and the Ministers and 
Secretaries Act, 1924.  In accordance with the Constitution and the 1924 Act, 
ministers will continue to retain overall responsibility for government departments 
and offices, which they will exercise within this new framework.
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The governance changes may be summarised as impacting on different 
dimensions of accountability: political; managerial; and citizen (see Figure 2).  At 
the political level, ministers hold a pivotal position both in terms of reporting back 
performance information on their areas of responsibility to the Oireachtas and in 
terms of specifying the performance expected of government departments, offices 
and agencies.  The Oireachtas has an enhanced role to play, particularly with regard 
to the role of Oireachtas committees.  At the managerial level, secretaries general 
have delegated responsibilities for managing their departments, implementing and 
monitoring policies and delivering outputs agreed with the minister.  They in turn 
can assign specific responsibilities to managers at other levels, who must report on 
progress in their defined areas of responsibility. Staff in general can expect greater 
clarity in delineating their responsibilities and accountabilities, and will have to 
respond to requests for performance information from within their departments, 
offices and agencies, but also from the Oireachtas and directly from citizens.  At the 
level of the citizen, the public can expect a greater flow of information and access to 
information held by public bodies.
One further specific issue concerns the implications for accountability of the 
new organisational forms which are appearing on the public service landscape.  The 
growth of executive units and bodies and of bodies with specific regulatory 
functions have implications for all the dimensions of accountability.
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Figure 2
Dimensions of Accountability
· The political dimension
- ministerial responsibility and accountability 
- Oireachtas responsibility and accountability
· The managerial dimension
- Linkages between ministers and heads of department
- Line management and staff accountability
· The citizen dimension
- flow of and access to information
3.  New patterns of accountability in practice
The changing governance and accountability relationships outlined above are not 
unique to Ireland.  Many other OECD countries are facing similar challenges, some 
for a number of years.  This section briefly explores some of the issues relevant to 
Ireland and how they are being tackled elsewhere.  Firstly, political accountability 
aspects are covered:  how accountability to ministers and national parliaments is 
evolving.  Secondly, changing internal management accountability arrangements are 
looked at.  Thirdly, the issue of accountability to the citizen is discussed.  Finally, 
the accountability implications of new organisational forms and structures, such as 
agencies and regulatory bodies, are explored.
3.1  Political accountability
The issues here revolve around ministerial responsibility and accountability and 
parliamentary responsibility and accountability.
3.1.1  Ministerial responsibility and accountability
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Under the Public Service Management Act, 1997, ministers retain overall 
responsibility for government departments and offices.  Members of the government 
are collectively responsible to Dáil Éireann for departments of state administered by 
them.  Ministers have a duty to inform and explain actions to the Oirechtas, through 
such means as parliamentary questions.  As such, they retain the prime democratic 
accountability for actions in areas under their jurisdiction.
However, whilst retaining their responsibility and accountability role, the 
practice of this role is likely to change for ministers to some degree.  Judge, 
Hogwood and McVicar (1997, 97) have identified five levels of ministerial 
responsibility:
· Redirectory responsibility, requiring that ministers redirect queries to the 
appropriate person dealing with a particular case or issue.
· Informatory responsibility, requiring the minister to keep parliament informed 
of what is happening in his or her department.
· Explanatory responsibility, requiring the minister to make further explanation, 
particularly in cases of once-off shortcomings or wrong doings.
· Amendatory responsibility, where a minister is convinced that more than an 
explanation is required, requiring correction, amendment or reparation.
· Sacrificial responsibility, where a minister accepts an obligation to resign.
The new governance arrangements in Ireland are likely to affect these areas 
of responsibility, though not necessarily equally or in a straightforward manner.  As 
with the New Zealand public service reforms, the Public Service Management Act, 
1997 specifies that ministers are responsible for choosing outcomes and selecting 
outputs and that public servants are responsible for producing the outputs.  Civil 
servants, and agency heads, are increasingly likely to have queries re-directed to 
them for response in the first instance.  But this does not mean that ministers can re-
direct responsibility for the management of their departments.  As Boston (1996) 
notes with regard to New Zealand.  
Within a parliamentary democracy, such as New Zealand, cabinet ministers 
are the political heads of their departments.  This role carries with it political 
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and legal responsibility for everything the department does, or fails to do, in 
carrying out the policies of the government and administering the lows of 
the country.  As such, ministers are answerable to Parliament and the public 
for the activities of their departments, whether or not they have knowledge 
of these activities.  Hence, if a department is clearly operating inefficiently, 
the relevant portfolio minister must explain to Parliament what is going on, 
why it is going on, and what is going to be done about it.  And the minister 
must, as part of his or her role responsibility, ensure that something is 
actually done to put things right.
There has been some discussion in recent times aiming to create a distinction 
between ministerial responsibility and accountability, limiting responsibility to 
actions taken personally by the minister.  In this scenario, accountability applies to a 
minister’s duty as the representative in parliament accountable to parliament for 
departmental policies.  But he/she cannot be held responsible for everything that 
goes on within a department.
Whilst it is sensible to recognise that ministers cannot be directly responsible 
for every action in a department, a fact which the Public Service Management Act 
recognises in delegating specific functions to particular civil servants, this 
distinction between responsibility and accountability is not a cut and dried one.  The 
UK Public Service Committee (1996) report referred to above reviewed this issue, 
and rejected the distinction between responsibility and accountability to explain 
ministerial obligations to parliament.  The committee developed their own working 
definition of ministerial responsibility, focusing on the obligation on ministers to
give an account and the liability to be held to account:
Ministers owe a fundamental duty to account to Parliament.  This has, 
essentially, two meanings.  First, that the executive is obliged to give an 
account – to provide full information about and explain its actions in 
Parliament so that they are subject to democratic scrutiny.  This obligation is 
central to the proper functioning of Parliament, and therefore any Minister 
who has been found to have knowingly misled Parliament should resign.  
While it is through ministers that the Government is properly accountable to 
Parliament, the obligation to provide full information and to explain the 
actions of government to Parliament means that Ministers shall allow civil 
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servants to give an account to parliament through Select Committees where 
appropriate...
Second, a Minister’s duty to account to Parliament means that the executive 
is liable to be held to account: it must respond to concerns and criticism 
raised in Parliament about its actions because members of Parliament are 
democratically elected representatives of the people.  (Public Service 
Committee, 1996, 19).
This point concerning ministerial responsibility and accountability was 
highlighted in Ireland by the Supreme Court judgement in the case of Devanney v 
District Judge Daniel Shields, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Minister for 
Justice, Ireland and the Attorney General (Irish Times Law Report, 23 February 
1998).  This case concerned the validity of appointment of a district court clerk by a 
departmental official under the authority of the Minister.  The Supreme Court ruled 
that the appointment was valid, and that the Minister did not have to be personally 
involved in the appointment.  The court upheld the application of the Carltona
principle that no minister could ever personally attend to all the functions given to 
them.  The Chief Justice noted that constitutionally, the decision of an official is the 
decision of the minister.  The minister is responsible, it is he who must answer 
before parliament for anything his officials have done under his authority.
To summarise these discussions, taking the five levels of ministerial 
responsibility outlined above, current changes in the Irish governance framework 
are likely to lead to ministers increasingly using redirectory responsibility, either 
through referring queries to agency heads or heads of independent units, or through 
instructing civil servants allocated responsibility for specific functions under the 
Public Service Management Act to deal in the first place with a query.  The 
enhanced information which the changes in management practice promoted by the 
SMI, Public Service Management Act, 1997, and Freedom of Information 
legislation aim to produce should lead to an enhanced ability for the carrying out of 
informatory, explanatory and amendatory responsibility.  Sacrificial responsibility is 
likely to remain largely a political issue.  
Indications from practice elsewhere if these changes are to operate 
effectively are that ministers  should allow individual civil servants to give an 
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account through Oireachtas committees as appropriate.  However, ministers 
themselves must continue to give a full account of actions.  There must be 
recognition that the minister remains the political head of his/her department, and 
whilst they may not be directly responsible for managerial actions taken, they retain 
responsibility for both giving an account and for being held to account, responding 
to concerns raised in the Oireachtas.  Traditional forms of accountability such as 
parliamentary questions still have an important role to play in the process.
3.1.2  Parliamentary responsibility and accountability
Civil servants will increasingly be likely to be asked to report directly to Oireachtas 
committees under the current legislative changes as has been indicated above.  The 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has long had an important role in ensuring the 
wise use of public money, with secretaries general accountable to the PAC as 
accounting officers.  Other Oireachtas committees have subsequently been 
established, and in late 1997 in a review of committees and their operation, the 
government agreed a revised structure and profile of Oireachtas committees.  One 
of the new committees established is to look specifically at SMI issues and 
operational matters.
In Britain, a recent review of accountability and responsibility undertaken by 
the Public Service Committee of the House of Commons outlines arrangements for 
civil servants reporting to parliament and consequent issues.  With regard to civil 
servants reporting to parliament, the Committee first set out the constitutional 
position, that while civil servants exercise many of the powers entrusted to ministers 
under statute, they do so because the minister has delegated those powers, and the 
power remains the ministers (Public Service Committee, 1996, 34).  The principle 
of ministerial responsibility limits what civil servants may say when giving evidence 
to select committees, in that officials give evidence on behalf of ministers under 
their directions:
Officials are bound to present government policy on behalf of their 
departments, and not to undermine it: as the Osmotherly Rules3 say, 
“Officials should as far as possible confine their evidence to questions of fact 
and explanation relating to government policies and actions ... Officials 
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should as far as possible avoid being drawn into discussion of the merits of 
alternative policies where this is politically contentious.” (Public Service 
Committee, 1996, 35).
Some commentators have indicated that this position in effect leads to a 
failure of proper accountability of the executive arm of government to parliament, 
especially where a minister declines to accept accountability and blames civil 
servants for faults or failures that have occurred.  It also can lead to government 
resistance to a request from a select committee that a named civil servant give 
evidence, where the committee is inquiring into alleged wrongdoing in a 
department.  As the minister retains responsibility, so the argument goes, the 
minister should determine which official should represent him/her.  In response to 
this issue, the Public Service Committee recommend that there should be a 
presumption that ministers accept requests by committees that individual named 
civil servants give evidence to them (Public Service Committee, 1996, 39).
As well as the ability of committees to call up named civil servants to appear 
before them, there is the question of the accountability of independent regulatory 
bodies to parliamentary committees.  This issue has been illustrated recently in 
Ireland by the refusal of the Director of the Office of Telecommunications 
Regulation to appear before an Oireachtas committee.  While she subsequently 
attended a meeting of the committee, she maintained the view that attendance was 
not a requirement of her Office.  Members of the Oireachtas questioned the 
accountability of the Office, if the Director is not accountable to the Oireachtas 
(Irish Times, February 13, 1998).  Similar issues have arisen in the UK both in 
terms of independent regulatory offices and of government agencies, leading to one 
academic calling for chief executives to be made directly accountable to the relevant 
committee of the House of Commons, and the development of an explicitly 
contractual relationship between officials and ministers (Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee 1992-93, Appendix 6, 296-7).  
The Public Service Committee in the UK also considers the broader 
question of the ability of select committees to act as effective scrutineers of the 
executive, ensuring accountability.  The resourcing of committees and the way they 
conduct their business were identified as key issues here.  The ability of committees 
to ask the right questions with the resources currently at their disposal was 
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questioned.  With regard to how committees conduct their business, a key point 
was raised in discussions at the Committee with an expert witness:
Kate Jenkins raised broader questions about the way in which select 
committees conduct their work.  The usual format under which select 
committees obtain information from the government – formal evidence 
sessions in which a civil servant or a minister is asked questions and gives 
answers – she referred to as “a modern organisation dealing with a rather 
old-fashioned form of accountability.”  What it produced, she argued, was 
not informed debate, but “very formal and quite protected and carefully 
thought-through answers”.  (Public Service Committee, 1996, 67).
Another expert witness Sir Peter Kemp, suggested that select committees 
should act as ‘shareholders meetings’, quizzing departmental heads and agency 
chief executives about their performance in relation to targets, based on reports 
from an independent audit body (Public Service Committee, 1996, 62).
This final point of independent support for parliamentary committees is 
echoed by Mulgan (1997) in a review of public accountability in Australia.  He
mentions that the investigative activities of the Auditor General and Ombudsman, as 
well as freedom of information legislation, has strengthened the role of 
parliamentary committees as agents of accountability.  He accepts criticism that the 
ability of parliament to control and direct the executive is weak.  But, in the context 
of accountability processes overall, he does not necessarily see this as a limiting 
factor in Australian accountability arrangements:
...the issue is not so much whether parliament itself, or its officers, have 
formal powers of enforcing their recommendations so much as whether their 
scrutinising and auditing activities lead eventually to appropriate responses 
from the government, provoked if necessary by other channels of 
accountability ... there are strong incentives on ministers to react positively 
to public criticism.
3.2  Managerial accountability
Governance and Accountability in the Irish Civil Service
18
Managerial accountability refers to the accountability of public servants to 
ministers, the Oireachtas and ultimately to citizens for the management of the public 
service.  Two key issues here are the accountability relationship between ministers 
and secretaries general, and the accountability of line managers and staff.
3.2.1  Accountability between ministers and secretaries general
The Public Service Management Act, 1997, aims to clarify the responsibility and 
accountability arrangements within government departments and offices.  The Act 
indicates that, subject to policy determined by the relevant minister or the 
government, secretaries generalwill have authority, responsibility and accountability 
for a range of issues, including the management of the department, preparation and 
submission of a strategy statement, and determining how responsibilities are to be 
assigned to other officers in the department.  The Act states that the secretary 
general is accountable to the minister for the tasks assigned under the new 
management structure.  Progress reports must be made to the minister on the 
implementation of the strategy statement.
In practice, there is a degree of shared responsibility between ministers and 
heads of department which cannot be fully removed.  As Boston (1997, 7) states 
with regard to New Zealand, which has probably gone furthest in attempting to 
specify the roles of ministers and heads of department:
Some people appear to assume that if person A is responsible for Z, then 
person B cannot also be responsible for Z.  Hence, if a departmental chief 
executive is responsible for the management of a department, then a minister 
cannot also be responsible ... But such a view is nonsense ... Within the 
public sector, shared responsibility is the norm rather than the exception.  
Cabinet ministers are collectively responsible for what the government 
decides ... ministers are politically responsible (to parliament and the public) 
for what their departments do, while chief executives are managerially
responsible for the operations of their departments.  Necessarily, these 
respective responsibilities overlap a good deal; they cannot be precisely 
delineated.
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It is, therefore, within this context of shared responsibilities that attempts to 
clarify accountability relationships must be seen.  One significant attempt is the use 
of performance agreements between ministers and heads of departments, which in 
some ways is paralleled by the use of strategy statements in Ireland.  In both New 
Zealand, for government departments, and Britain for executive agencies, chief 
executives are formally held accountable to ministers by the use of performance 
agreements and ex-post performance assessment.  Chief executives sign written 
agreements with ministers setting out performance targets.  Their success in 
meeting these targets is assessed annually.  Chief executives pay may be varied 
accordingly.
Schick (1996, 73) sets out the New Zealand approach: “Ministers and 
managers must agree in advance on financial performance and the outputs to be 
produced, the money to be spent on agreed outputs, and the quality and timeliness 
of the work to be performed.  This advance specification of performance enables 
minister and managers to compare the volume, cost and quality of the outputs 
actually produced to planned levels.  This is the essence of managerial 
accountability.”  Each department sets out output targets in the Estimates, the 
annual purchase agreement and the departmental forecast report (DFR).  Purchase 
agreements take the form of contracts although they do not have the force of legal 
contracts.  The main part of the agreement specifies, in output terms, some key 
results that the chief executive should give priority to achieving.  Practice in putting 
together the agreements varies, though the most common approach is for chief 
executives to draft the agreements, with ministers inserting some matters that he/she 
is concerned with (Schick, 1996, 79).
Departmental forecast reports (DFRs) are a relatively new addition to the 
accountability regime in New Zealand.  These give each department an opportunity 
to describe what it plans to do and spend, providing a benchmark for accountability 
in that annual reports will compare outturns to the results forecast in the DFRs.  
DFRs have been subject to some criticism by departmental managers on the ground 
of duplication of information held in other documents and the work burden they 
represent (Schick, 1996, 78).  Annual reports, comparing planned and actual 
performance, are also actively used in Sweden and Australia to enhance 
accountability for financial and operational results (OECD, 1997, 23).
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This contractual system of accountability between ministers and heads of 
department aims to provide a number of benefits, summarised by Irwin (1996, 13):
· Ministers have relatively complete and precise information about what their 
departments do and how much it costs, facilitating better ministerial 
management and budget decision-making.
· Government departments and agencies themselves have a clearer understanding 
of their outputs.
· Written agreements give both ministers and departments a better understanding 
of what the department is intended to do in the year ahead.  Ministers have a 
stronger basis from which to make complaints about poor performance.  Chief 
executives have a stronger basis from which to defend themselves against 
unreasonable complaints.
However, there are also limitations associated with this contractual 
approach.  There are significant transaction costs associated with the development 
and monitoring of performance agreements.  Significant resources must be devoted 
to the operation of the accountability system.  There is also the danger of the 
development of a ‘checklist mentality’, where compliance with delivering specified 
outputs precludes concern with broader impacts and outcomes.  Even when 
contract specification works well there may be other problems, as Irwin (1996, 15)
notes: “ ... ministers may have little interest in assessing the performance of their 
agencies ... Parliament may also be less interested in pursuing performance issues 
rather than other issues in its review of department or agency operations, thus 
reducing the pressure on ministers to assess performance.  There is a risk therefore 
that their monitoring turns out to be perfunctory and the effects of monitoring on 
performance weak.  Departments might be able to set themselves easy targets, and 
in any case expect few problems should they fail to meet even these targets.”
These limitations have led some commentators such as Irwin (1996) and 
Boston (1997) to call for other mechanisms in addition to written agreements to 
ensure that departments and agencies perform well and are accountable.  The 
fostering of norms of professionalism, loyalty and public service are promoted as 
other useful means of ensuring accountability, as is the appointment of and training 
support for highly skilled people to run departments and agencies.
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In Ireland, the Public Service Management Act, 1997 identifies the strategy 
statement as a key element of the new relationship between ministers and heads of 
department.  The degree to which strategy statements become ‘contractual’ 
documents will be a central issue to address under the new governance 
arrangements.  Indications internationally are that there is a move to more formal 
contracting between ministers and heads of department, based on written 
agreements.  But the costs associated with such contracting need to be kept in 
check, perhaps through seeing strategy statements as a type of ‘relational’ contract 
rather than a formal contract (Boyle, 1992).  The increasing use of departmental 
and agency annual reports as ex-post tools of accountability, comparing planned 
with actual results, would also seem to be a useful development.  In this context, 
annual reports move from being descriptive documents of achievements to being 
providers of systematic information on performance, possibly subject to audit as is 
the case in Sweden.
3.2.2  Line management and staff accountability
The Public Service Management Act, 1997, gives secretaries general the power to 
assign responsibility for the performance of functions to officers or to a grade or 
grades of officers of a department.  These officers are deemed accountable for the 
performance of assigned functions to the secretary general or head of office, and to 
such other officers as may be specified.  There is thus a focus on clearly specifying 
what is to be the responsibility of managers and staff, with civil servants being much 
more aware of what they are taking on.
This raises the question of how much in the public eye civil servants will 
become, and the implications of this.  Public service anonymity is no longer as 
strong as it was.  As Tait (1997, 3) notes when commenting on Canadian 
developments: “officials can and do appear before parliamentary committees to 
provide information or explain their actions without injuring responsible 
government ... anonymity is a more elastic principle than it first appears.”
Associated with this issue is the extent to which civil servants will be subject 
to blame for problems that occur.  A Canadian review of public service value and 
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ethics undertaken by a task force of senior officials, when considering blame, 
indicated that:
· office holders are responsible for everything that occurs under their authority;
· the issue of they being subject to personal consequences such as discipline or 
blame depends on the circumstances in any particular case;
· the key consideration is whether an office holder caused a problem, or ought to 
have taken steps to avoid it (Tait, 1997, 4).
But regardless of blame or anonymity, clearly there is a need to develop 
mechanisms to parallel the increased delegation of responsibility, that assure 
ministers, parliament and citizens that civil servants are accountable for their 
actions.  The Canadian task force, cited above, feels that such accountability should 
be internal to the public service, through the hierarchical system.  The means by 
which this is done is likely to influence its acceptance.  Mayne (1997, 159) proposes 
to put the emphasis on what he calls accomplishment accountability rather than 
blame apportionment:
What is needed to complete the accountability loop in a reformed public 
service, is the incentive to demonstrate what results have been 
accomplished.  They key is to make this demonstration the essence of the 
accountability regime.  Accomplishment accountability is the credible 
demonstration of what one has achieved that is of significance and value.  
To be of value implies that performance is reported on in the context of pre-
established expectations of what was to be accomplished.  
In such an accountability regime, for managers and staff to be in control and 
to be able to demonstrate how programmes are performing means:
· knowing what you are supposed to achieve;
· knowing in a timely manner the results that have been achieved;
· being able to credibly demonstrate what was achieved;
· constantly striving for more cost-effective ways of achieving the results; and
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· being able to show that you acted wisely on this knowledge, i.e. that the 
decisions and actions you took were reasonable in light of what happened. 
(Mayne, 1997, 160).
The Canadian government has been attempting to promote such an 
approach to accomplishment accountability by public servants, through the 
promotion of a ‘managing for results’ focus to government activity.  For example, 
accountability contracts have been developed to help link long-term objectives to 
performance indicators for the Travellers Programme, operated by the Customs 
Border Service of Revenue Canada, dealing with the international movement of 
people and their baggage as they enter Canada.  Accountability contracts are 
produced between top management in customs and the six regional directors.  
Expected performance for the fiscal year is set out and is the subject of discussion 
and input from field staff.  Although not compulsory, three regions have also 
established additional accountability contracts with the next level of management, 
dealing with district managers and port managers (Report of the Auditor General of 
Canada, 1997, 20-21).
Such an accountability for results perspective also applies to team-based 
working, an increasing feature of the work of civil and public servants (Boyle, 
1997).  For accountability to work effectively at the team level, the team must have 
clear, specific and agreed performance goals; responsibility for individual and group 
tasks must be clearly assigned; and the teams’ reporting relationship clearly 
specified.
In terms of enhancing accountability for results, identified here as a key 
issue in line management and staff accountability, the current performance 
management initiative underway in the Irish civil service will be vital.  In particular, 
the personal performance plans and identification of key results and outputs will 
need to operate successfully if the ability to demonstrate results is to be achieved.
3.3  Accountability to the citizen
The Freedom of Information Act, 1997, will have a significant impact on 
accountability arrangements in Ireland.  Citizens will have a statutory right of access 
to information held by public bodies, subject to some exemptions.  The provisions 
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also establish an Office of Information Commissioner with powers of investigation 
and appeal.  This job will be undertaken by the Ombudsman, although the Office of 
the Information Commissioner is to be separate and independent with its own staff.
Government bodies will be required to publish manuals detailing the 
information they hold.  Thus records created by civil servants will be accessible to 
citizens.  An ‘audit trail of decision’ is created which can be followed.  This has led 
to some concern that legislation may lead to less frankness and candour of advice 
being offered by public servants to ministers, and that decisions may be more likely 
to be made and passed on orally rather than on paper.  However, international 
experience indicates that this, in fact, has not happened in practice.  Public servants 
from countries that have introduced freedom of information legislation, such as 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada, indicate that there has in fact been an 
improvement in the quality of reporting, advice and decision making, with no 
detrimental effects on frankness and candour (Doyle, 1997).
For public servants operating under new procedures determined by the 
Freedom of Information Act, a significant issue will be ensuring the public’s right to 
know in a context where sensitive information on significant issues is being dealt 
with.  The application of the public interest test to the release of information will be 
crucial here.  The Ombudsman has indicated that it will be necessary for public 
bodies to demonstrate to him as Information Commissioner how the public interest 
would be harmed or not served by the release of information (Murphy, 1998).  In 
other words, the presumption is that individuals should have access, except in very 
limited and exceptional cases, to information held about them by public bodies.
As well as the Freedom of Information Act, a greater emphasis on 
accountability to the citizen is likely to arise from the envisaged delegation of 
responsibility to civil servants allied with the increased focus on quality of service 
delivery.  As Barzelay (1992, 128) states with regard to this move from hierarchical 
to citizen accountability:
As a way to overcome the hierarchical and remedial thrust of accountability 
in the bureaucratic paradigm, attention should focus on the spectrum of 
working relationships, including the customer relationship, through which 
public servants create results citizens value ... From a post-bureaucratic 
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perspective, accountability between the parties engaged in such working 
relationships should be a two-way street.  For example, providers should be 
accountable to customers for meeting their needs for quality and value, 
while customers should be accountable to providers for clarifying their own 
needs and for giving feedback.
Such accountability arrangements direct to the citizen have been formalised 
in a number of jurisdictions through the use of citizen or customer charters.  In 
Britain, the Citizen’s Charter is regarded as a pioneer for such approaches.  The aim 
is to promote quality, choice, standards and value, and to set and monitor specific 
service targets aimed at improving services to individual citizens, providing relevant 
complaint and redress mechanisms.  However, in practice some charters set 
standards so vague as to be meaningless; for most services there is no financial 
compensation; standards are not binding; and few charters are independently 
audited or overseen (Wilson, 1996).  Thus whilst there is general welcome for the 
concept of using charters as a means of enhancing direct accountability to citizens 
for service quality, in practice there can be problems with its application.
In Ireland, the Quality Customer Service Initiative and the associated 
production by departments and offices of customer service action plans represents a 
first step towards the setting of specified service targets.  Crucial to their success, as 
indicated above, will be the degree to which such targets are audited and followed 
up with appropriate action, and an assessment of the relevance of the targets to 
customer expectations and needs.
3.4  Accountability and new organisational forms
The public service management reforms in Ireland in part take the form of 
enhancing and improving current structures and processes for public management.  
But they also facilitate and enable the development of new governance 
arrangements in terms of new organisational forms and processes.  These in turn 
have implications for accountability.  Two key developments are the creation of 
executive bodies and units, and the move to independent regulation in certain areas.
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3.4.1  Accountability and executive bodies
Executive bodies have a long tradition as an element of governance in the Irish 
public service.  Bodies such as An Bord Pleanála, with a quasi-judicial function, and 
An Post and Telecom Éireann with a commercial focus, have been in existence for 
some time.  More recently, bodies such as the Irish Aviation Authority have been 
moved from the civil service to state-sponsored body status.  A Prisons Agency is in 
the process of being established, and executive units are a key element of the 
Department of Agriculture and Food’s strategy for change.  There is a growing 
interest in the role of executive bodies, either internal to departments or external, in 
the management of government activities.
Some lessons can be learnt from public service reform in Britain, where 
there has been the delegation of many government functions to executive agencies.  
These agencies exist within their parent departments, but they are given 
considerable management freedoms.  This move has created considerable debate as 
to whether or not such changes lead to the creation of a ‘democratic deficit’.  In this 
scenario, ministers can eschew political accountability by indicating that an issue is 
an operational one for management to deal with.  Managers, in turn, can state that 
they are formally accountable to the public and parliament through the minister.  
Accountability thus falls between the cracks in the system.  Similar concerns have 
been raised in the Netherlands, where concerns have been voiced about the effect of 
agencies from the viewpoint of the primacy of politics and democratic control of 
such organisations (Kickert and Verhaak, 1995, 540).  However, others have 
argued that accountability has, in practice, been enhanced by the creation of 
executive bodies.  The argument here is that the formal delegation of responsibility 
to agency chief executives can offer better accountability because it makes the 
relationship between the minister and the chief executive clearer and more 
transparent.  The framework document, a quasi-contractual agreement between the 
minister and chief executive, has a key role in clarifying this relationship in Britain.
The Public Service Committee in Britain considered the accountability of 
executive agencies in their review of ministerial responsibility and accountability.  In 
order to enhance and clarify accountability arrangements, they recommend action in 
three key areas (Public Service Committee, 1996, 50-57):
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· Information from agencies.  Whilst recognising that the agency system, 
combined with the Citizen’s Charter, had led to a huge expansion in information 
available, the Committee note that information could be improved, particularly 
with regard to how demanding agency targets are and how good the 
performance of agencies is, with more use of comparative information.
· The accountability of agency chief executives.  While there have been calls for 
chief executives to be directly accountable to parliament, they have remained 
accountable through the relevant minister.  In practice, however, chief 
executives often give information direct to parliament.  They give evidence to 
committees about the work of the agency.  They provide written answers to 
parliamentary questions which are printed under their own names.  The 
Committee recommend that such practices continue and grow, with more 
emphasis being put on delegating to chief executives the obligation to give an 
account, with the liability to be held to account, regarding the concerns raised in 
parliament, remaining with ministers.
· The responsibilities of ministers and chief executives.  The Committee 
recommends the more precise specification of roles and responsibilities of 
ministers and chief executives in framework documents.  Making the documents 
more explicitly contractual, as in New Zealand, is considered worthy of further 
investigation.  The Committee also recommends that select committees become 
more involved in the development of framework documents, commenting on 
framework documents and agency corporate plans both before they are 
published and when they are reviewed.
With regard to the accountability of chief executives, some have called for a 
situation in agencies where chief executives are made accounting officers for the use 
of resources, with the head of department as accounting officer for the allocation of 
resources to the agencies (Pliatzky, 1992).  This is similar to the situation proposed 
in the Report of the Steering Group on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the 
Garda Síochána (1997), that the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána be made 
accounting officer for the probity of expenditure and for obtaining value for money.
An issue with regard to some executive bodies refers to the role of public 
servants on the boards of such bodies where management boards exist.  With regard 
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to accountability, boards of public bodies are responsible for the stewardship of 
public funds and all aspects of performance, and should submit themselves to 
appropriate external scrutiny. The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy (CIPFA, 1984) indicates that this accountability is achieved by all 
parties having a clear understanding of those responsibilities, and having clearly 
defined roles through a robust structure.  But for public servants on boards, whilst 
they are legally accountable to the company, they are also often seen as having a 
role as the ministers representative on the board.  Balancing these roles can be a 
challenging task, as the recent Hepatitis C tribunal of inquiry indicates.
A further key issue concerns the impact of the development of executive 
bodies on the remaining ‘core’ staff of the government departments with overall 
responsibility for the executive bodies.  One of the main drivers behind ‘hiving off’ 
executive functions to specific units or separate bodies is to enable government 
departments to focus more on policy, strategy and the monitoring of executive 
performance.  In some instances, removal of responsibility for day-to-day activities 
will have profound implications for departmental staff, involving a re-orientation of 
their work.  Developing appropriate skills and competencies to take on these new 
tasks is a particular challenge for government departments.  In the context of 
accountability, developing the capacity to monitor and evaluate the performance of 
executive bodies without becoming ‘heavy-handed’ presents particular challenges 
for government departments.  A concern with results and outcomes achieved rather 
than simply with process is important here.
In all, the move to devolve functions to executive bodies has important 
implications for governance and accountability.  How these changes impact in 
Ireland, in cases such as the prison service, will depend on how the change is 
managed.  Pointers from abroad indicate that getting reliable and timely output and 
results data from agencies will be important in making them operate effectively.  So 
too will ensuring adequate accountability between ministers and chief executives.  
Contractual style agreements, and making chief executives accounting officers for 
the use of agency resources, are possible mechanisms that can be used in such 
cases.  Also, the implications for the remaining ‘core’ staff of departments must be 
addressed if they are to take on a more policy and outcome focused role.
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More broadly, there is the issue of whether agencies should be decoupled 
from departments as separate organisations or whether powers should be devolved 
to them, whilst they remain a part of the organisation, as for example is the case 
with the Social Welfare Services Office (SWSO) in the Department of Social, 
Community and Family Affairs.  Schick addresses this issue in his study for the 
OECD (1997, 21-22), and indicates that the devolution option, as practised by 
France and Australia, might best achieve the benefits of agency status without 
incurring some of the risks.  Certainly, the SWSO has contributed significantly to 
the effective operation of the Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs.  
The SWSO was set up in 1986 with responsibility for the delivery of services.  In 
terms of accountability it drew up its own mission statement and objectives and 
instituted a wide range of targets to meet these objectives.  Information technology 
was extensively used to facilitate change, and the measurement of customer service 
was given a high priority.  These measures facilitated a significant reduction in the 
number of representations and parliamentary questions being dealt with by the 
department (McCumiskey, 1992).
3.4.2.  Regulatory accountability
Inspection and regulation functions have taken on an increasing role in the review of 
public service operations in recent years.  As competition for service provision 
increases in areas such as telecommunications and energy, independent regulators 
have an increasingly important role in facilitating competition.  Regulators also have 
an important role in ensuring that the customers needs are addressed and quality of 
service issues tackled appropriately.  The creation of the Office of 
Telecommunications Regulation in Ireland, referred to earlier in this paper, is an 
example of the move to independent regulation.
Regulation is also increasingly featuring as an accountability mechanism in 
the delivery of professional services, such as teaching, policy and medicine.  
Hughes, Mears and Winch (1997, 300) note this trend:
What is apparent is that the mechanisms or organisations charged with 
regulation and accountability ... have become more formalised, and are more 
likely to lead to wider dissemination of results and are more likely to involve 
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outsiders.  In the name of accountability, regimes have been developed 
which have directed a more penetrating and critical gaze on public service 
work with, in some cases, potential for punitive consequences at the level of 
the individual.  There appear to be two major directions in which these new 
modes of regulation have gone.  First, there has been a growing emphasis 
and significance attached to measurable outputs as shown by the 
proliferation of various types of performance indicators and league tables.  
Second, there has been a growing interest in the regulation of the process of 
public service work.  The monitoring of process, as opposed to outcomes, 
has been allocated to service-specific inspectorates or specialist agencies of 
one sort or another and these are charged with reporting on the activities of 
the personnel under their scrutiny.
This regulatory and inspection function is increasingly being handled by stand alone 
agencies. In both Britain and New Zealand, independent agencies have been 
created, such as the Office of Standards in Education (OFSTED) in Britain and the 
Education Review Office (ERO) in New Zealand.  Such agencies carry out 
independent reviews of practice.  However, some commentators have warned of the 
dangers of an over-reliance on external review, and have promoted a balanced 
approach combining both internal and external review to achieve accountability for 
service quality.  As Winberg (1996, 162) states: “The mechanisms of external and 
internal review combined with elements of quality management practices and 
participation are seen as providing the necessary system of checks and balances to 
achieve quality service delivery and enhanced accountability.  External review 
establishes accountability while quality management principles, practices and tools 
such as self-assessment, staff and client feedback and the like, attempt to foster a 
spirit of co-operation.”
4.  Emerging Issues and Concluding Comments
The traditional ‘Westminster’ model of accountability in the civil service is a 
hierarchical model in which formal accountability rests with ministers, accountable 
to parliament.  In this model, civil servants are accountable to ministers, via their 
supervisors, in the chain of management accountability.  However, as Mulgan 
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(1997, 25) notes, new governance arrangements mean that now, in practice, a 
variety of channels of public accountability impinge upon civil servants:
Departmental officials are said to be accountable not only to their immediate 
superiors and ultimately to the minister but also to a range of external 
institutions, such as parliament and its committees, reviewing offices such as 
the Auditor General and the Ombudsman and the courts.  Public servants
are also accountable directly to members of the public themselves and, 
indeed, on occasion to their own professional consciences.  
The development of these multiple channels of accountability is apparent in 
Ireland.  New governance arrangements, such as those arising from the Public 
Service Management Act, 1997, and the Freedom of Information Act, 1997, will 
impinge directly on how civil servants are held accountable.  These new 
developments rest alongside other channels of accountability such as the 
Comptroller and Auditor General and the Ombudsman, and complement and 
develop existing arrangements with regard to accountability to ministers and to the 
Oireachtas, such as the Public Accounts Committee.
4.1  Emerging Issues
The legislative and management changes outlined in this review will impact on how 
accountability operates in the Irish civil service in the future.  A number of 
significant issues and developments emerge from the review of governance and 
accountability changes outlined in the paper.  These are outlined using the 
framework developed for this review, covering the political, managerial and citizen 
dimensions of accountability, and also referring to new organisational forms and 
their impact.
Political accountability
With regard to the implication of changes for ministerial responsibility and 
accountability, it is likely that the governance arrangements proposed will enhance a 
minister’s informatory and explanatory responsibilities, improving their ability to 
give an account to the Oireachtas of what is happening in their department.  
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Amendatory and sacrificial responsibility – being held to account – is likely to 
remain primarily a political issue.
The Oireachtas will have an enhanced role to play in governance and 
accountability, with Oireachtas committees having a central role in the new 
governance arrangements.  Civil servants are more likely to appear before such 
committees.  Central to their effective functioning will be their ability to take on an 
enhanced accountability role.  The resourcing and supporting of committees is likely 
to be a key issue if they are to perform effectively.  So too will be the manner in 
which committees operate.  If question and answer sessions become ‘set pieces’ 
their ability to scrutinise activities will be limited.  Determining an appropriate 
approach for the conduct of business will be an important challenge for committees.
For individual civil servants, a crucial issue will be balancing the tension 
between providing full and frank information to committees they are increasingly 
likely to be called before, and at the same time operating under the framework that 
they appear before committees giving evidence on behalf of ministers and under 
ministerial direction.  They may be asked why they recommended certain policy 
options as specific issues.  In practice, there may at times be difficulties in providing 
information, but not commenting on government policy or the objectives of such 
policy (Ó Riordáin, 1998).
Managerial accountability
A notable trend internationally is the extent to which accountability arrangements 
between ministers and heads of department, and in some instances between 
department heads and line managers, is increasingly becoming contractual in nature.  
Formal agreements are being used to help specify responsibility and authority.  But 
joint or shared responsibility cannot be completely removed in a public service 
context, and will remain a feature of the system.  The extent to which more formal 
agreements develop in Ireland, for example making strategy statements 
‘contractual’ agreements, is an issue to be considered here.
Line managers, staff teams and individual staff, are likely to feel the changes 
in managerial accountability in a number of ways.  Civil servants are likely to be 
much less anonymous than in the past, and to have specific responsibilities 
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delegated or assigned to them.  In this context, being able to demonstrate what has 
been achieved with resources allocated and responsibilities delegated will clearly be 
an important issue.  Initiatives underway to enhance performance management and 
measurement will play a crucial role here.
Citizen accountability
Direct accountability to the users of public services is likely to increase both 
through the Freedom of Information legislation and through quality of service 
initiatives.  The Information Commissioner will also act as a channel for 
accountability to the citizen.  At issue here is the development of appropriate 
mechanisms for ensuring accountability, the setting of relevant standards, and 
establishment of complaint and redress procedures.
Individual civil servants will have to ensure that adequate ‘audit trails of 
decision’ are maintained in an accessible manner.  As well as developing such 
mechanisms and procedures, civil servants are also likely to be more pro-active in 
setting quality and value standards, and ensuring feedback from service users.  With 
increased delegation of responsibility will come more of a focus on quality of 
service delivery issues.
New organisational forms and accountability
New organisational forms such as executive units could, unless care is taken, lead to 
situations of blurred responsibilities between agency heads, secretaries general and 
ministers to the extent that none could be held accountable.  A key challenge here is 
to restructure those parts of the public service suited to agency operation whilst 
ensuring that agencies are fully accountable both to ministers and to the Oireachtas.  
The use of performance agreements could be considered, though there are
limitations here as discussed above.  Also, there is a key question of whether chief 
executives should give evidence to the Oireachtas on behalf of ministers or in their 
own right?  This relates to the broader issue of ministerial responsibility and 
accountability referred to above.  Similarly, there is the question of whether 
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executive units should be decoupled from government departments, or 
responsibilities devolved to them within existing structures.
For regulatory bodies, a key issue is managing the tension between their 
statutory independence and their accountability to the Oirechtas.  Also, while 
regulatory bodies have an important role to play in independently reviewing 
practice, this should not be seen as negating the need for organisations to develop 
strong internal quality review mechanisms and procedures. 
4.2  Concluding comments
The costs associated with accountability, and ensuring an appropriate balance 
between the costs of applying accountability mechanisms and the benefits from them 
warrants comment.  As New Zealand has found, implementing a rigorous system of 
accountability to suit new governance structures can be a costly business.  This is 
both in terms of the resources devoted to ensuring accountability, and the time 
needed to develop ex-ante specifications and ex-post reporting arrangements.  
There are also other ‘costs’, such as the danger of developing a check-list mentality 
to accountability. There is always the danger that new modes of accountability are 
added onto existing arrangements to meet new requirements, without any overall 
assessment of the costs and benefits.  A key issue here is the need for some body or 
bodies to overview accountability arrangements as they develop and ensure that the 
benefits arising outweigh the costs involved, and that unnecessary or outdated 
arrangements are stripped away.
A further comment refers to the role of public service ethos in enhancing 
democracy.  The focus in this paper has been on the development of appropriate 
accountability mechanisms to meet new governance arrangements.  But an over 
mechanistic approach can lead to an over regimented regime.  And there are always 
ways to be found around any system that is put in place.  At the end of the day one 
of the best means of ensuring accountability is where civil servants take the initiative 
and want to be accountable, rather than having accountability forced upon them.  
The public service ethos of honesty, integrity, impartiality, objectivity and a desire 
to serve the public interest is important in determining a positive approach to 
accountability issues.  The promotion and maintenance of this public service ethos is 
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a central challenge for public service management.  Several jurisdictions are looking 
to incorporate aspects of the public service ethos in legislation so as to provide a 
degree of coherence and consistency at a time of change.  As public service values 
may vary cross-culturally, each jurisdiction must ensure an appropriate statement of 
public service ethos to suit its own particular requirements.  In Ireland, the issuing 
of a Civil Service Code, as envisaged by the SMI Human Resources Management 
Working Group, could have a key role in re-enforcing and making more explicit the 
cultural values and ethos of the civil service.
As stated at the beginning of this paper, changes taking place in governance 
and accountability are still very much at an early stage in the Irish civil service.  
However, a number of key pointers would seem to emerge from this overview of 
issues which will merit further consideration as governance and accountability 
issues arising from current changes are pursued:
· The accountability relationship between ministers and secretaries general is a 
key issue to be addressed.  The growth in the use of contractual agreements is 
one notable development internationally.  Also notable is the sharing of the 
‘giving an account’ function between ministers and heads of departments and 
agencies, with responses to queries being handled, for example, by agency heads 
in this first instance if the issue is one for which they have designated 
responsibility.  The minister retains ultimate political accountability as political 
head of the department.
· The greater prominence being given to the management of executive functions 
will present a key accountability challenge.  Devolution of executive functions 
within existing organisations rather than decoupling of agencies as separate 
organisations may in certain cases facilitate accountability.  Also, making agency 
heads accounting officers for the use of resources with the head of department 
as accounting officer for the allocation of resources to agencies is a model 
worthy of further exploration.
· Various ‘models’ for governance and accountability have been identified.  
Devolution of executive functions represents an internal management option; 
the promotion of independent agencies represents a more market or quasi-
market led approach to change; the development of a public service ethos 
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represents the promotion of core values to enhance accountability.  Deciding 
which of these ‘models’ is appropriate to a particular situation, or the best mix 
of approaches, is a key political and management challenge.
· Whichever approach to governance and accountability is developed, 
performance management has a prominent role to play in enhancing 
accountability for results.  This is particularly so in the identification of key 
results and outputs.  Associated with this is the use of annual reports as 
systematic comparators of planned versus actual performance.
Governance and accountability arrangements are currently evolving and 
developing in the Irish public service.  They have the potential to enhance the way 
the public service is managed.  Conversely, if handled poorly, the new arrangements 
may lead to failures in accountability and in the delivery of services.  How the issues 
identified in this paper are tackled will in part determine which scenario evolves.  
What is apparent is that changes in governance are bringing about differing 
underlying forms of accountability in the public service. Accountability mechanisms 
such as contracts, trust and professionalism are being developed.  Selecting the 
most appropriate mechanisms for particular governance structures provides a 
continuing challenge.
Notes
1. This paper, whilst raising and exploring issues in its own right, also 
complements the proceedings of the Institute of Public Administration’s 1997 
Annual Conference, which was on the topic of governance and accountability 
(see Boyle and McNamara, 1998).
2. For a more detailed examination of recent legislative changes and their 
implications than is covered here, see Tutty (1998).
3. The Osmotherly Rules are guidance issued by the Cabinet Office on 
‘Departmental Evidence and Response to Select Committees’.  They state that 
officials who give evidence to select committees do so on behalf of ministers 
and under their directions.
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Appendix 1
Governance: Some Definitions
The term governance is one that is popular at the moment.  It is also a nebulous 
term, difficult to pin down.  It means different things to different people. 
Governance is often used instead of ‘government’, but this seems unsatisfactory as 
it is simply replacing one term with another.  The OECD (1995) have defined 
governance as:
The act of governing seen in a wide sense.  The term covers public 
administration and the institutions, methods and instruments of governing.  It 
further incorporates relationships between government and citizens (including 
business and other citizen groupings) and the role of the State.
Rhodes (1996) has identified six separate uses of the term governance:
· As the minimal state, referring to the trend in some countries to privatise 
and open out to the market as much of the public service as possible.
· As corporate governance, focusing on the way in which top management 
and boards of management execute their responsibilities and authority, and 
how they account for their actions.
· As the new public management, where more emphasis is put on ‘steering’ 
the public sector (more governance) rather than on administering systems 
(less government).
· As good governance, as promoted by the World Bank, covering the 
distribution and use of political and economic power.
· As a socio-cybenetic system, where governance reflects the effects of social-
political-administrative interventions and interactions, arising from 
negotiations amongst affected parties.
· As self-organising networks, with services provided by a mix of government 
and the private and voluntary sectors.  Governance in this context is about 
managing networks.
The World Bank, as mentioned above, have been promoting good 
governance, and in this context define governance as “the manner in which power is 
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exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for 
development” (The World Bank, 1994, xiv).  The Bank identifies three aspects of 
governance: (a) the form of political regime; (b) the process by which authority is 
exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources; and (c) 
the capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies and 
discharge functions.
Whilst there is a broad spectrum of uses associated with the term 
governance, one key message coming out from the definitions is that governance is 
concerned with the process of governing.  Governance focuses on the way in which 
power and responsibility are allocated and exercised.  Whatever definition is used, 
governance would seem to be concerned with: “the collection of rules, standards 
and norms that inform the behaviour of civil and public servants and politicians in 
conducting the business of state with and on behalf of the public” (Tutty, 1998).  
Given the broad changes outlined by Schick above, these rules, standards and norms 
are currently changing so as to focus accountability more on individual public 
service managers, in the context of devolution of previously centralised powers.
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